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Abstract: A drastic decline in fertility rates in Korea is accelerating the unprecedentedly
rapid population ageing. This phenomenon calls into question what role the economic
forces play in the decisions and which public policies can be e®ective. As population ageing
induces a shortage of labor force that sustain the economic growth, this paper notes that
stimulating women's labor supply as well as encouraging fertility is a very important policy
goal in an ageing society. Having this in mind, I investigate the e®ectiveness of family
policies that are frequently used in developed countries. For this purpose, I ¯rst analyze
the dynamic decisions of fertility and labor supply in a lifecycle framework, where time
costs associated with children, time and goods investment in children, and uncertainties
in earnings are important determinants of women's decisions. Based on the model, I
then conduct policy experiments which evaluate the e®ects of policies including child
allowances, conditional childcare subsidies, pronatal income tax, and maternal leaves. The
¯ndings show that providing bene¯ts conditional on or through labor market activities
are more e®ective than the provision of unconditional transfer in encouraging fertility
without reducing labor supply of women.
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\Bear two and rear them well."As this propaganda slogan from the 1970s suggests, the
Korean government has made e®orts to stop explosive population growth through family
planning, which contributed to a reduction in the total fertility rate (TFR) from 4.53 in
1970 to 1.59 in 1990. However, the TFR continued to decrease to a record low of 1.08 in
2005 (See the ¯rst panel in Figure I), among the lowest of the OECD countries and a main
factor accelerating the ageing of society. If this fertility trend persists, the dependency
ratio, the ratio of those aged over 65 to those aged between 15 and 64, is expected to rise
dramatically to the unprecedented level (the second panel in Figure I). This will pass on a
huge burden to future generations since only a limited number of the working young will
have to sustain the economy. Although the ageing of society is a common phenomenon
among developed countries, the problem in Korea is more serious in the sense that the
ageing process is far more speedy and little preparation for it has been done.1 Thus,
e®ective policy measures are in great need to resolve problems induced by low fertility
and population ageing.
A number of factors can in part explain such a drastic change in fertility, among which
an increase in women's market activities is often attributed as a main determinant. The
upheaval of women's social status due to higher education and a reduced gap between
male and female wage rates stimulated women's market activities. Considering a well es-
tablished fact that an increase in price of women's time raises opportunity cost of children
and reduces fertility, but increases labor market returns, there seems to be a negative rela-
tionship between fertility and labor supply. However, encouraging and utilizing women's
1The period during which the proportion of elderly increases from 7 to 14 percent is expected to be
only 19 years in Korea, whereas in other countries such as France (114 years) and Sweden (82 years) the
same process took much longer. Although the TFR has been below 2.1 since 1980 for almost 25 years,
no family policies to encourage fertility is introduced until year 2004.Fertility and Labor Supply 2
labor supply is critical to compensate for a shortage of labor force in a low fertility era.
In this case, increasing women's labor supply without reducing the fertility rate or vice
versa is a crucial policy goal. This could relieve numerous problems associated with an
ageing society by boosting the current and future labor force. However, there is little un-
derstanding about women's fertility and the labor supply decisions of married women in
Korea, and few attempts has been made to suggest e®ective policy measures to encourage
both fertility and labor supply of women.2
In this study, I explain how a woman determines the timing and number of births as well
as her labor supply, based on which I investigate some family policies. A dynamic lifecy-
cle model is constructed to endogenously determine women's fertility and labor supply.
Following Becker (1960), the demand for children is not di®erent from the demand for
durable goods for which a economic agent considers its quality and quantity. In deter-
mining the quality of a child, both goods and time investment in children are considered.
This is particularly important because the expenditure for children in Korea is higher
than other countries (Choi ,2003). In particular, when children are young and need time
intensive care, women's drop out rate from the labor market is higher than any other
periods. This temporal drop out from the labor market due to child birth or care is rarely
observed in developed countries partly due to abundant child care facilities and family
friendly labor market policies. I further investigate these under a more realistic setup by
incorporating varying childcare costs, uncertain environment, heterogenous initial asset
and borrowing constraints.
A large volume of literature is devoted to examining women's labor supply in response to
fertility decisions. These studies focus on women's labor supply, treating fertility as an
2Birth out of wedlock is a rare event in Korea, partly due to cultural reasons and severe social stigma.
Single parent families (either divorced, widowed or never married) consist of less than 10 percent of the
total number of families according to reports by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Thus, the
analysis here is con¯ned to the fertility decisions of married women.Fertility and Labor Supply 3
exogenous decision (Heckman, 1974; Heckman and Macurdy, 1980). The ¯ndings suggest
that the presence of children discourage women labor supply by reducing e®ective wage
rates because they have to hire child care while working. Thus, the provision of child
care and reduction of its cost is suggested as a policy measure that encourages women's
labor supply. However, the estimates of women's labor supply treating fertility exogenous
may be biased since these decisions are simultaneous. Other studies focus on women's
fertility decision. A common approach is to consider the trade o® between quality and
quantity of children(Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Barro, 1988). In this case, the
theory predicts that women's wage rates, labor force participation(LFP, hereafter) and
education would have a negative e®ect on fertility by increasing the opportunity cost of
having children, while household income has an ambiguous e®ect on fertility depending on
substitutability of the quantity and quality of children. There are studies that incorporate
both fertility and labor supply of women, and they often use a lifecycle model to capture
the dynamic aspect of the decisions (Mo±tt, 1984; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Hotz
and Miller, 1988). In line with this, an investigation into a simultaneous decision of
women's fertility and labor supply within a dynamic framework is conducted.
For this purpose, I use panel data from 1998 to 2003 and calibrate the model to capture
the main features of them. Through this exercise, the model shows how the fertility and
labor supply are determined and respond to changes in exterior factors. Findings suggest
that the increase in real wages of women is largely responsible for the growth in women's
LFP. However, as women's earnings increase, the investment in children increases as
well, compounding the e®ect on fertility. Increase in education costs and uncertainties in
earnings also play a role in reducing fertility and increasing labor supply. Having described
how the model works, policy experiments using the model are conducted. In particular,
the e®ectiveness of family policies is investigated, that are frequently used in countriesFertility and Labor Supply 4
where a high proportion of women work. These policies include child allowances (e.g.,
Sweden, France, and U.K.), childcare subsidies (e.g., U.S. and Sweden) and tax credits
(U.S. and U.K.), and maternity leaves (e.g., Sweden, Japan, and U.K.). Although these
are all family friendly policies to help mothers with children, each policy has di®erent
policy goals and consequences. I discuss the objectives of these policies and consider
policy environment where these policies take e®ects. The results suggest that transfers
conditional on work to raise real wages (e.g., tax credits or childcare subsidies for working
women) are more e®ective than universal transfers (e.g., child allowances).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a descriptive analysis on
the pattern of fertility and labor supply, and their relationship. Section III presents a
dynamic model through which a woman decides her lifetime fertility and labor supply.
Section IV discusses the calibration and estimation results obtained. Section V conducts
policy experiments based upon which policy implications are drawn. Section VI concludes.
II. Women's Fertility and Labor Supply.
Women's fertility and labor supply are so closely related that considering one without the
other makes little sense. In this section, I describe the trend of declining fertility rate,
increasing women's market activities, and their seemingly negative correlation. Then I
present the underlying factors that might be important in determining both decisions.
A. Trends in Fertility and Labor Supply
The overall LFP of women in Korea is low, compared to other developed countries. As of
year 2003, the average labor force participation rate of women is 52.8 percent in Korea,
which is the fourth lowest among OECD countries ahead of Turkey (28 percent), MexicoFertility and Labor Supply 5
(41 percent) and Greece (51 percent).3 This means that there is room for women's labor
supply to increase. As Panel A of the Figure II presents, women's LFP in Korea is lower
than that of developed countries for almost all age groups. One striking feature is that
Korean women's LFP shows a `M' shaped pattern, while other countries show a smooth
reverse `U' shaped one. This implies that a number of women drop out of labor market
when they have births, some of whom return to the market as children grow. Panel B
of the Figure II shows that this pattern has been persisted, although the timing of the
sudden decline in the LFP has been delayed. In 1995, when the average age at ¯rst
marriage is 25.4, the temporal drop out from the market prevailed for women between 25
and 34. As the age at ¯rst marriage increases to 26.5 in 2000 and to 27.5 in 2004, and
the labor force participation of women between 25 and 29 increased from 48% in 1995 to
64% in 2004, most drop-out's happen for the women between ages 30 and 34. However,
the LFP pattern is still `M' shaped, suggesting births can be a impediment of women's
labor supply.
The increases in LFP may explain or be explained by the reduction in the birth pattern.
The last panel of Figure II shows the total number of births by women's ages. A signi¯cant
decline and delay in births over time is observed. The number of births born to women
of 25-29 has considerably dropped and the LFP of these women has increased at the
same time. Regardless of the causality whether a decline in birth induces an increase in
women's LFP or vice versa, reconciliating both family and working seems to be di±cult
for Korean women.
There are direct and indirect costs associated with fertility. The direct costs of fertility
include inevitable time costs to take care of children especially when they are young,
and goods and time investment in children's human capital. The indirect costs that are
3See OECD (2004) for detailed information on each country.Fertility and Labor Supply 6
opportunity cost of fertility include foregone earnings when a woman has to give up her
labor supply due to childbearing. This time cost associated with fertility reduces time
available for market activities and causes labor supply decline. The increase in indirect
cost of fertility due to the increase in women's wage rate further decreases fertility while
increases their labor supply. However, de¯ning the relationship between fertility and labor
supply is not simple. The goods investment in children's human capital, for example, such
as education expenses sometimes motivates women to work more to appropriate the money
to pay. Lower labor supply and labor earnings may reduce the demand for children by
income e®ect, ceteris paribus. Thus, specifying the relationship between the simultaneous
decision of fertility and labor supply, requires a careful investigation.
III. Analytical Framework
In this section, a dynamic model to investigate how a woman decides her fertility and
labor supply in a lifecycle framework is presented.
A. Model
An economic agent's decision problem throughout life is maximizing the expected value of
the present stream of discounted utility. In each period, the economic agent derives utility
from her composite consumption goods (ct), child service (qt), number of children (kt) and
her leisure (lt). There is no explicit altruistic motive from parents toward children. The
preference of a woman is assumed to be intertemporally separable. The expected lifetime





t¡Iu(ct;qt;kt;lt)] (1)Fertility and Labor Supply 7
where the operator E denotes the expectation over the uncertainties in a woman's future
earnings and her household income and ¯ presents the time preference.




bj indicates a birth at age j. The quality of children which provides child service (qt)
is produced with goods, gt, and maternal time investment, mt; qt = f(gt;mt). The last
argument in the utility, the woman's leisure, is speci¯ed as lt = 1 ¡ zt ¡ ht ¡ mt, where
zt is ¯xed time cost associated with children and ht is her labor supply. The ¯xed time
cost of children zt is a function of the age of each child re°ecting the intensity of care that
varies with the child's age.
The budget constraint she faces when solving the maximization problem in each period
is denoted as
ct=Á + gt + at+1 = wtht ¡ ¿(wtht) + (1 + r)at + yt; (2)
where Á is the woman's share of household income, 1+ r is a risk free gross interest rate,
¿ denotes her income tax that depends on her labor earnings, wt is the wage rate, and yt
is exogenously given non-mother after-tax income. Subject to this budget constraint, she
chooses her consumption and asset level, the number and spacing of births, and goods
and time investment in children in order to maximize her lifetime utility. Let the problem
be presented in a recursive form using a Bellman equation.4 The dynamic programming
problem of a woman at age j where I · j · Q is given by5










4To simplify notation, time subscripts are omitted and the problem is speci¯ed at woman's age j.
Variables at age j ¡ 1 and age j + 1 are represented with subscript -1 and superscripts 0 respectively.
5Note that she faces a similar problem except that b = 0 from time Q through D, and that h = 0;g = 0,
and m = 0 after R (retirement).Fertility and Labor Supply 8
subject to
c=Á + g + a
0 = wh ¡ ¿(wh) + (1 + r)a + y
k
0 = k + b;
l = 1 ¡ m ¡ z ¡ h;
q = f(g;m)
where Q is the last reproductive period.
For choice variables, c;g;m;h; and a0, solutions at each period is obtained for each case
where the birth takes place and not; b = 0 and b = 1. Then in terms of the fertility





















If V0(y;w;k;a;j) > V1(y;w;k;a;j) then b = 0, and vice versa. The dynamics of the model
comes from the intertemporal allocation of resources and consumption smoothing, and
the fertility decision that a®ects future stock of children and time available for market
activities. The allocation of time between labor, investment in children, and leisure are
static from equation given the maximum time available for mothers excluding the ¯xed
time costs associated with children.Fertility and Labor Supply 9
IV. Estimation and Calibration
A. Functional Forms
In this section, assumptions on functional forms of utility, time costs according to chil-
dren's ages, and child quality production are made.













The consumption, the quality and quantity of children, and the leisure are separable. The
quality and quantity of children, substitutable for each other, contributes to the utility of
parents.
² Production Function of Child Service: Assuming that the child service is produced with







1=´; ´ < 1 (7)
where ´ represents substitutability of two inputs.
² Fixed time costs associated with children: The time cost is a decreasing function of
child's age.6 If bj = 1, then the child's age at time t is t ¡ j. Thus, at time t > I, when
the number of children is kt =
t P
j=I
bj, the total time cost associate with all children under
6It is common that the intensity of care that is re°ected in the ¯xed time cost of children is assumed
as a decreasing function of child's age. For example, see Hotz and Miller (1988) and Attanasio et al.






t¡j; 0 < Á < 1:
Using the Korean Time Use Survey 1999 and 2004 waves, time costs to take care of
children by age are obtained. Hotz and Miller (1988) report that a newborn requires 109
minutes per day. I ¯nd that Á = 0:95 and ° = 130:11, which means the newborn child
requires about 130 minutes per day and the time costs reduces with child's age by 5% per
year. Assuming that a woman has 16 hours of non-sleeping time a day, a woman with
newborn child loses 13.5% of her time that could have been used for her leisure or work.








t¯ + ²t; t = 1;:::;T; (9)
²t = c + ¹t; ¹t » N(0;¾
2
¹); (10)
where c is unobservable individual characteristics that do not vary over time. The latent
variable of wages are only observed when the woman works. Thus the coe±cients are
obtained from the dynamic tobit model (See Table 1.).7
² Non-mother Income Process: Since the large part of non-mother income consists of
7It is noted that the current wages are not dependent on previous work history, which means that the
disruptions of work does not a®ect the wage rate. This setup, seeming less reasonable, is justi¯ed from
data that the wage rate does not depreciate when returned to work. It might be because women usually
work for low skill sectors where experience or continuity of work matters little. Women with disrupted
work history might have reduced her reservation wage that has otherwise risen. The answers for this
puzzle should be investigated. However, this issue remain for future research.Fertility and Labor Supply 11
Table 1: Estimates for the Mothers' Earnings Process







High school graduate 0.369¤¤¤ 0.303¤¤¤
(0.097) (0.052)
College and above 0.662¤¤¤ 0.548¤¤¤
(0.098) (0.064)
Lag of ln(wage) 0.108¤¤¤
(0.019)
Variance of individual-speci¯c 0.649¤¤¤
errors(c) (0.024)
Variance of error terms 0.609¤¤¤
(0.009)
Note:The dependent variable is log wage rate of women. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*,**, and *** denote statistical signi¯cance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
husband's labor earnings, the expected household income is speci¯ed with husband's
characteristics including age and education as
lnyj = x0
j¯ + uj;
uj = ½uj¡1 + ²j;²j » N(0;¾
2
²)
where yj is household non-mother income when her age is j, xj includes husband's age,
education, indicator of big city and two earner household, uj is an AR(1) error term of
the equation, and ²j is a zero mean i.i.d, normally distributed error term.
Table 2: Estimates for the Non-mother Income
Variables Constant Age 0.01*Age2 High school College+ City ^ ½ ^ ¾²
Coe®. 3.716¤¤ 0.154¤¤ -0.166 0.346¤¤¤ 0.577¤¤¤ 0.040 0.429 0.934
(S.E.) (1.439) (0.079) (0.107) (0.079) (0.083) (0.050)
Note:Omitted category is less than high school group.
*,**, and *** denote statistical signi¯cance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
² Income Tax: Following Scholz et al. (2006) and Gouveia and Strauss (1994), the incomeFertility and Labor Supply 12
tax is parameterized as
¿(I) = a0(I ¡ (I
¡a1 + a2)
¡1=a1) (11)
where I = wh, a0 re°ects the proportional part of the tax to the income, a1 is the
degree of progressiveness of the tax and a2 re°ects the lump-sum part of the tax. Using
the Household Consumption Survey, I estimate a0, a1, and a2 at 0.11, 2.47 and 0.13,
respectively. This ¯gures mean that the income tax is very progressive (a1 > 1), which
might provide a partial answer for the phenomenon that the labor supply of women is
not proportional to their education.8 Given this functional form, the derivative of tax




B. Matching with Data
In addition to the parameters obtained as above, the discount factor (¯) and the coe±-
cient of relative risk aversion (¾) are assumed to be 0.96 and 2.0, respectively, which are
conventionally used. For a benchmark case, I assume that the capital market is imperfect
and that the current consumption depends only on the current income stream.9 Then
the coe±cient of child service production function, ´, and other parameters for utility
function, A;·;³;», and B are to be estimated from the data. For this process, I select
a sample of married women aged from 20 to 40 with at least one child. Since the model
incorporates endogenous women's labor supply, I restrict sample women who has worked
8It is usually observed that the women with higher education work more because they have higher
earnings potential and opportunity cost of not working. However, in Korea, the women with college and
above education work less than those with junior college degree, although they work more than the high
school graduates.
9Considering that a young couple has substantial credit constraint in Korea, which sometimes is a
barrier to fertility itself, and a great amount of asset accumulation goes to housing, this assumption seems
more realistic than a °exible credit market.Fertility and Labor Supply 13
at least one year during the 6-year period. The data used are taken from the Korean
Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), a longitudinal survey of a representative sample
of Korean individuals and the households. About 5,000 households and 13,300 individuals
have been annually interviewed since 1998. This study uses 6 waves of the data from 1998
to 2003. For the empirical analysis, I select the sample with the following criteria: (1)
the same husband and wife headed the households from 1998 through 2003, (2) the wife
is less than 40 years old in 2003, (3) the household has at least one child prior to 2003,
and (4) the wife has worked at least one year between 1998 and 2003.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Wife's Characteristics Mean S.D. Family Characteristics Mean S.D.
Age 36.2 (3.0) AgeH 39.6 (3.5)
Less than High School 15.5 (3.6) Less than High SchoolH 14.6 (3.5)
High School Grad 60.8 (4.9) High School GradH 50.0 (5.0)
College and above 23.7 (4.3) College and aboveH 35.4 (4.8)
Annual Earnings 2,467 (9,737) Non-mother Annual Income 3,581 (10,404)
(when positive)
Overall LFP 57.3 (5.0) Annual Educational Expenses 565 (698)
LFP within 5 years since birthy 34.0 (4.7) Total Household Income 4,597 (15,750)
Age at First Birth 25.2 (2.9) Number of Children 1.48 (0.5)
Individual Num. Obs. 452 Total Num. Obs. 2,712
Note: Subscript H denotes husband's characteristics.
Earnings, incomes and expenses are presented in 2000 terms. The unit is 10,000 won.
From the data, the information on the wife and husband's demographic and labor market
characteristics is collected. Household characteristics are included as well. The summary
statistics of sample women are presented in Table 3. On average, the age and education
level of husbands are higher than those of wives. About half of the women in the sam-
ple participated in the labor force and their annual earnings were 25 million won (about
25,000 dollars.). Non-mother income is the total household income excluding wife's labor
earnings. The average non-mother income and total household income are 36 and 46 mil-Fertility and Labor Supply 14
lion won, respectively. The average number of children in these households are 1.3, while
the maximum number of children in the sample are four. Almost all of the households
(93 percent) spend positive amount on their children. The educational expenses include
childcare costs, and private and public education fees, which consists 12 percent of the
total household income.
Using this data set, the parameters of interest is obtained by matching the simulated
moments with the actual moments from data. The computational detail of the simulated
methods of moments (SMM) including the numerical solution of the model and simula-
tion is described in the Appendix. Table 4 presents the parameters estimated and their
matching moments. The predicted and actual value shows that the model well captures
the main features of the data.
Table 4: Parameters Estimated and the Model Fit
Parameter Statistics Data Model
Time and goods use of women
A=0.01 Labor supply(annual hours of work) 2,489 (1,041) 2,519
B=0.03 Overall LFP 57.3% (5.10) 60.1
» = 1:1 LFP within 5 years since birth 34.0% (4.7) 60.1
· = 0:6 Income share of expenditure on children 29.3% (5.5) 27.8
Fertility
³ = 0:3 Number of children 1.48 (0.6) 1.5
´ = 0:7 Age at ¯rst birth 25.2 (2.9) 25.7
The model also captures the `M' shape pattern of the labor force participation. Before
a woman has a birth, she maintains a high participation rate. While she has births and
children are still young, she drops out of the labor market. She then returns to work when
children get older and her wage rates increase with her age.
C. Explaining Fertility and Labor Supply Decisions
The model suggests a few factors that can shift the overall fertility and labor force partic-
ipation of women over time. The main factor is women's wage rates that determine theFertility and Labor Supply 15
cost of children and returns to work. The wage rates of women compared to those of men
have largely increased over time. The average women's wage rate increased from about
260 dollars per month in 1980 to 1,120 dollars per month in 2004, which is equivalent
to an increase from 44 percent to 66 percent of men's wage rates. Due to both absolute
and relative increases in wage rates increase women's labor supply and the opportunity
cost of having children, inducing decline in fertility. Increases in volatility and uncer-
tainties of income also a®ect women's decisions. The income inequality due to the gaps
between and within skill groups increased, which re°ects more volatility of income. The
risk averse economic agent responds to the increase in income uncertainties. The greater
the uncertainties, the less likely to reduce working and have children.
Partly due to the changes in relative wage rates of men and women, and income volatility,
the timing of marriage has been delayed.10 The increase in the age at marriage delays ¯rst
birth, which reduce the remaining reproductive periods. Given the reversed `M' shape of
the age earnings pro¯le, the later the births, the larger the opportunity costs of them.
Thus, the delay in births reduces the total number of births. Since the out of wedlock
births are rare events in Korea, the delay in marriage equivalent to the delay in ¯rst birth
reduces total births by far. The age at marriage of Korean women increased from 22.6 in
1972 to 27.5 in 2004.
V. Policy
A. Family Policies Frequently Used
Child allowances
10Although the decisions whether and when to get married can be of great interest, they are left for
future research.Fertility and Labor Supply 16
Child allowances are tax exempt cash transfer provided to the households conditional upon
the birth and the number of children. These allowances are used to provide equitable eco-
nomic wellbeing to the households with and without children, noting that children are
costly. They are also politically appealing because the society or government shares the
responsibility for raising children with households. Child's allowances are in practice in
many European countries including Sweden, France and the U.K., although the amounts
and duration of allowances vary across countries. Generally, some ¯xed amounts of ben-
e¯ts are provided from birth to a certain age, and supplementary subsidies are provided
for a birth or a large number of children. Since these bene¯ts are universal and do not
impose any eligibility criteria about income or labor market participation, they may have
a negative e®ect on labor supply through an income e®ect. In addition, child allowances
like other universal bene¯ts are ¯scally burdensome and thus bene¯t level is usually low,
which in turn may not have a great impact on fertility. Even though they actually have
an e®ect on fertility, it is likely to be upon the decision of low income families, which may
expose these families to the child poverty problem. Therefore, apart from the political
function of child allowances, there are disputes on actual e®ect of child allowances in
encouraging fertility (e.g., Laroque and Salanie, 2005; Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997).
Childcare Subsidies
Childcare subsidies are widely proposed in-kind transfer to encourage both fertility and
the labor supply of women. In the U.S. where the majority of childcare facilities are
private, child care subsidies are provided as a sliding fee scale so that low income mothers
pay reduced price for childcare. Providers' cost of childcare are then reimbursed by the
government. In some European countries such as Sweden and France, universal public
childcare provided by municipalities is available at low cost. However, this costly provision
of universal public childcare is possible only when there is trust toward the public sectorFertility and Labor Supply 17
that they provide no worse quality care than the private care givers. When the private
market for childcare is already formed and the price and quality largely varies across
child care, and there is little prospect that the public outperforms the private sector,
there is little need to substitute private market with public facilities or universal subsidy
schemes. Without considering market conditions, the introduction of universal and °at
policy scheme may lower the quality of childcare as Baker et al. (2005) suggested. As far
as the equity is concerned, partial subsidies in a form of a voucher for low income families
can increase an access to child care at a low price.
Regardless of the form of subsidizing whether it is a subsidy or a direct provision of
public facility, when government implements policies to help with child care, it aims to
encourage women's labor supply. For example, child care subsidies in the U.S. requires
women's labor force participation, job search, education, or other equivalent activities to
receive them. Sweden's public child care, although it is well known for its wide coverage,
also prioritize double earning families and working mothers. Single earning families and
non-working mothers use private child care. Swedish women's labor force participation as
high as almost 80% may be in large part due such policies that bene¯t working mothers.
The Korean government currently provides child care subsidies in a sliding fee scale for low
income families. In particular, the families with children younger than six are, depending
on their income, subsidized upto 100, 60 and 40 percent of market price. However, it is
planned that the coverage of subsidies extends to whole families without income eligibility.
There is no requirement in labor force participation or education either. Subsidizing child
care without income eligibility and any labor market requirement is not only costly but
also discourages women's work incentives.
Pronatal Tax Scheme
An alternative way of supporting women's labor supply and fertility by reducing the costFertility and Labor Supply 18
of children is to devise a pronatal tax scheme. Tax reduction for families with children can
be either tax credits for working mothers or a reduction in tax base, both of which provides
varying bene¯ts according to the number of children. Although the tax reduction is not
an explicit transfer of money or goods for children, it implicitly aims to encourage births.
The main feature of these pronatal tax system compared to other family policies is that
they are contingent upon working in most cases and encourages labor supply. Examples
include the Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
in the U.S., and Child Tax Credit (CTC) and the Working Families Tax Credit (WTC)
in the U.K. The tax system in France reduces tax base by adjusting taxable income with
the equivalence scale so that large families pay less tax. Many studies have found the
positive e®ects of these programs on labor force participation; e.g., Blundell et al. (2000)
and Scholz (1996). Although not immediately observable, these pronatal tax scheme also
has positive e®ect on fertility (Whittington et al., 1990).
Maternal and Childcare Leaves
When a woman's market activities are interrupted by child bearing and rearing, there are
associated costs: the foregone income, the loss of returns to experience and the depre-
ciation due to non-participation. Since the latter two costs are not directly measurable,
policies mainly target to reduce the foregone income. Maternal and childcare leaves pro-
vide a paid or non-paid recess to a woman (or sometimes a man) for her birth and childcare
to reduce career disruption due to child bearing and rearing. The allowances and dura-
tion of those leaves vary across countries; e.g., leaves without payment for 12 weeks are
provided in the U.S. upon a birth, while paid leaves for more than a year are provided in
Sweden for a birth. These leaves are mandates to employers that they should guarantee
the retainment of and return to a job. However, costs resulting from mandates to em-
ployers tend to be transferred to employees. When mandates cost employers to bear someFertility and Labor Supply 19
burden, they can always adjust employment and wages to avoid it. As a result, mandates
originally aimed at bene¯ting some group may end up disfavoring them. Gruber (1994)
¯nd that the maternity bene¯ts mandated to employers to provide health insurance for
births reduces the employment and wages of young women who are likely to have births
in the near future. Therefore, policies like parental or childcare leaves that tend to cost
employers and coworkers should be carefully implemented.
B. Policy Experiments
Among these policies described above, only childcare subsidies have begun to be in practice
since 2004 with a limited coverage. However, policy makers currently suggest additional
policies that include almost all policies used in other countries. In this section, the e®ects
of child allowances, conditional childcare subsidies, tax credits, and parental leaves among
others are examined. In terms of projecting the e®ectiveness of program, cost and bene¯ts
should be carefully de¯ned. Costs include direct subsidy amounts and the changes in tax
revenue resulting from the changes in hours of work. Bene¯ts are more di±cult to specify
because improving utility may not necessarily be the policy goal to pursue. In this paper,
noting that the increase in labor supply is an important policy goal, I consider the policy
impact on quantity and quality of children and women's labor supply as well as utility.
In the following simulation, I make assumptions on program details to re°ect the main
features of each program.
² Child allowances: A ¯xed amount (M) is provided to the mothers with children from
0 to 5 years old. Child allowances could be provided until the child's age of sixteen like
in the UK or six in Japan. However, following Korean government's current suggestion, I
let child allowances be given until the age of ¯ve. This has a direct e®ect on the budget
constraint. The budget constraint at t readsFertility and Labor Supply 20
ct=¼ + gt + at+1 = wtht ¡ ¿(wtht) + (1 + r)at + yt + M(kt ¡ kt¡5):
Child allowances are expected to increase women's utility and encourage fertility by in-
creasing disposable income according to the number of children. However, the increased
income may discourage work incentives by income e®ect and have a negative e®ect on
labor force participation. Also, the increased income does not necessarily result in a
one-to-one increase in goods investment in children(gt).
² Conditional childcare subsidies: A in-kind transfer (G) is provided as goods investment
in children for children from 0 to 5 years as well as long as a woman works. Whether
government subsidize as a form of a voucher or direct service does not make di®erence in
this model. These subsidies a®ect the production function of child's quality:






G > 0; if LFP = 1
G = 0; if LFP = 0
and G = ¹ g(kt ¡ kt¡5),
where ¹ g is the amount of subsidy per child.
As the production function of child service suggests, the two inputs of goods and maternal
time investment are substitutable in determining child's human capital. When the public
goods G are invested in children, maternal time is saved so that it can be used for leisure
or labor supply. When the transfer is made contingent upon the labor force participation
of women, women's time is directed to labor market, increasing women's labor market
participation. As childcare subsidies reduce the cost of rearing children, they are likely to
have positive e®ects on fertility.Fertility and Labor Supply 21
² Pronatal tax credits: I consider tax credits that increase with the number of children.
While some tax credits are provided only to low income families to encourage low income
earners' labor supply, here I consider tax credits for all income levels. Given that the
labor force participation is not necessarily higher for higher earners in Korea, tax credits
for all income levels would encourage labor supply of women with all skill levels.11 To
be consistent with other policy experiments, tax credits are provided to mothers with
children under age six. In the model, a0 re°ects the proportional part of income tax and
is adjusted to capture the credits. When the tax credits are introduced, the income tax
reads:
¿(I) = (a0 ¡ E ¹ kt)(I ¡ (I
¡a1 + a2)
¡1=a1); ¹ kt = kt ¡ kt¡5
Since only working women can enjoy the bene¯t of tax credits, and the longer hours of
work, the greater the bene¯ts, there is positive e®ect on labor supply. Also, the structure
that the tax rates varies with the number of children will give a positive incentive of
fertility.
² Maternal or childcare leaves: Depending on the replacement rate and the duration of
leaves, the cost of introducing them largely vary. I consider a maternal leave that provides
20 percent of earnings for two years including birth year, re°ecting current Korean rule.12
When the average hours of work is h?, the budget constraint of the women who use leaves
11According to the Economically Active Population Survey, the labor force participation of women with
college and above is about 60 percent, while that of women with junior college is 67 percent.
12It is a current rule in Korea that 90 days of maternal leaves for birth and one year of childcare leaves
for women with children of age three or below are provided. For the maternal leave, only 30 days are
paid one. For the childcare leaves, 400 dollars a month, about 20 percent of average workers, are paid to
the employees. However, due to the cost to the employers, the utilization of childcare leaves is very low.Fertility and Labor Supply 22
reads:
ct=¼ + gt + at+1 = 0:2 £ wth
? + (1 + r)at + yt and lt = 1 ¡ mt ¡ zt
t = j;j + 1 and bj = 1
As mentioned, the younger a child, the greater the ¯xed time cost. When the maternal
leaves are provided to women with zero and one year old children, the saved time can be
spent for leisure and time investment in children. Most of all, women do not have to drop
out of labor market due to childcare costs. Thus, leaves are expected to have positive
e®ects on labor force participation. Since they do not have to fully give up their earnings,
the reduced foregone earnings due to child bearing and rearing will encourage fertility.
C. Results
Having investigated the likely e®ects and the mechanism of each policy, I compare the
e®ectiveness of them obtained from policy experiments. The costs of each policy includes
subsidy amounts less the increase in the present value of tax revenue due to increased
labor supply. The outcomes of interest in examining the e®ects of policies are changes
in the expected utility, the quantity and quality of children, labor force participation by
age, and hours of work. Table 5 presents the results of policy experiments. As expected,
introduction of policies overall increase fertility and the expected utility. Most policies
except for the universal child allowances have positive e®ects on labor supply. However,
the results from the policy experiments are based upon the assumption that there is little
lags or friction in introducing and conducting such programs.
As predicted, child allowances that make a universal transfer reduce the labor force par-
ticipation and hours of work. On the contrary, the conditional childcare subsidies when
provided contingent upon labor force participation have a great impact on overall partic-Fertility and Labor Supply 23












(subsidy+¢tax) - 6.572 3.528 9.014 6.194
(2) utility -21.427 -21.363 -21.370 -21.383 -21.402
(3) quantity of children 1.50 1.87 1.73 1.73 1.82
(4) quality of children 11.6 12.0 11.8 13.2 11.6
(5) LFP (overall) 57.6 54.5 72.8 65.4 64.5
(6) LFP (young)y 34.6 29.8 58.0 46.6 45.0
(7) hours of work 2,490 2,454 2,500 2,536 2,406
y indicates the labor force participation of women within 6 years since birth.
ipation rates especially for mothers with young children. Positive labor market e®ects of
the conditional subsidies also increase tax revenue from labor earnings and o®set some
of the subsidy costs. As a result, the overall costs of conditional subsidies, although the
subsidy amount that each household receives is the same with child allowances, are much
lower than those of child allowances. Then the e®ects on quality and quantity of children
per unit cost are greater for conditional subsidies than child allowances.
Tax credits here alleviate tax burden by about 2 percent of labor earnings per child for
women with children younger than six. Since the bene¯ts of tax credits depend on labor
earnings and hours of work if the wage rate is the same, this tax scheme encourages labor
supply. As a result, the labor force participation and in particular, hours of work increase.
While child allowances provide the same amount to all income levels and are concerned to
asymmetrically encourage low income families' fertility, tax credits proportional to their
earnings can encourage fertility of broader group of women. The conditional childcare
subsidies seem to be more e®ective than tax credits in the sense that they are less costly
while the e®ects are similar. However, tax credits that provide higher bene¯ts to higher
earners can increase the average quality of children because they make transfers to high
income families whose children are likely to have high quality.Fertility and Labor Supply 24
Lastly, the e®ects of maternal leaves are presented in the sixth column of Table 5. As
mentioned above, the experiments are based on the current rules on leaves that are limit-
edly in practice in Korea. Depending on program design including the replacement rate
and duration of leaves, the costs can largely vary. In addition, leaves may be misused
to avoid work by proper spacing of children. For example, if maternal leaves last two
years, women can avoid labor supply by having births every three years. This is why
the additional speed premium is devised to encourage short term spacing and to reduce
such misusage. However, if women care about cooperation with coworkers or returns to
work experience, such misusage would not be so frequent in reality. The policy experi-
ments that consider only the bene¯ts of maternal leaves without concerning employers or
coworkers may show the maximum e®ect possible. Maternal leaves have a positive e®ect
on the number of children and labor force participation. They can induce further labor
force participation because they are available only for working mothers than they simply
increase participation rates by counting those who are on leaves as workers. However, due
to the reduced hours of work during leaves, the average hours of work decreases. If part
time jobs as well as maternal leaves are available, more number of women would work
and bene¯t from maternal leaves.
VI. Conclusion
The substantial reduction in fertility and steady increase in women's labor supply calls
into question what role the economic forces play in the decisions and which public policies
can be e®ective. The investigation of this is useful because many countries face the same
problem of drastic fertility decline and accelerating ageing process. Countries that have
not experienced such rapid ageing can draw some lessons through this exercise. To answer
these questions, a dynamic lifecycle model where a mother makes decisions on fertilityFertility and Labor Supply 25
and labor supply is developed. The economic framework presented here incorporates im-
portant factors including inevitable time costs associated with and mother's investment in
children. Findings suggest women's wage rate, expenditure on children, and uncertainties
in household income play important roles. In particular, the majority of women have their
¯rst birth just after their marriage because they face an increasing wage pro¯le. However,
having children signi¯cantly reduces women's market time.
Based on the model, this paper provided some policy experiments. Widely used policies
such as child allowances, childcare subsidies, and tax credits are examined. Despite the
superiority of lump sum transfer in improving welfare, I claim that the conditional sub-
sidies such as tax credits are a more e®ective policy tool than the unconditional child
allowances. The important policy goal is to help women with expenses associated with
children without reducing the labor supply. Extensions of the model are available in many
aspects. The introduction of endogenous wage rate, which varies with work experience
and duration of non-participation would allow a deeper investigation of a role of work dis-
ruption due to births. However, as mentioned above, this require a careful speci¯cation
of wage equation considering the heterogeneity of women since the aggregate data does
not evidently show the depreciation of wage rate after work disruptions. An inclusion of
marriage decision would permit incorporating of the e®ect of delay in marriage on fertility
and labor supply of women.
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Appendix
Computational Details
This section describes the algorithm used to compute the solution to the economic agent's
dynamic programming problem. The algorithm of the solution includes a few steps. First,
make a guess for the parameters to be estimated from the model. Excluding the param-
eters obtained from previous literature or data sets directly, there are seven parameters
to be estimated from the model; ¾;A;B;·;³;» for utility function and ´ for production
function. Second step solves the ¯nite period dynamic programming problem given all the
parameters using the backward induction (See below for details about numerical solution.)
Third, based on the decision rules computed in the second step, perform a simulation by
drawing random error terms of wage and non-mother income equation from the normal
distribution. Then individuals with lifetime consumption, fertility and labor supply paths
are constructed. Fourth, using simulated data, compute the distance between the simu-
lated and actual outcomes. Fifth, revise the guess for the parameters of interest for the
distance to be minimized.
A. Numerical Solution
Consider all the cases where the woman has k children over t periods, which are tCk
cases. To reduce the computing costs, the case with the age di®erence between adjacent
siblings greater than ¯ve is excluded. For each case, create grid points for ²y and ²w. Let
²y 2 f²y1;²y2;:::;²ymg, and ²w 2 f²w1;²w2;:::;²wng. Using the parameters of Autoregressive
process of y and w, obtain the probability matrix ¦ and ¥, where ¦(i;j) = prob(²0
y =
²yjj²y = ²yi) and ¥(i;j) = prob(²0
w = ²wjj²w = ²wi). Assuming that the economic agent
do not leave bequests or debt, aD = 0, given the guess of ¯nal asset level for each state,
aD¡1, compute a value function at t = D, which is a m£n matrix. According to the EulerFertility and Labor Supply 29
equation, we compute the solution at t = D ¡ 1, satisfying
u
0(CD¡1) = ¯(1 + r)¥¦u
0(CD): (12)
When CD¡1 is found at each state space, using the budget constraint, aD¡2 is obtained.
In a similar way, ¯nd the associated solution backwards to obtain a0. Assuming that the
initial asset level is zero because there is no bequest in the model, update the guess of
aD¡1 so that a0 for each state space to be zero. Through this procedure, when the initial
value function at each state space for each case of fertility is obtained, choose the fertility
case for each state that gives the maximum value function.
B. Monte-Carlo Simulation
Draw a pair of (²y;²w) at each period according to the Normal distribution of each variable.
Using the decision rules obtained above, ¯nd the solution paths for all choice variables.
Make 500 draws to construct a simulated data set. Using this data set, obtain the moments
of interest. Repeat this process of constructing simulated data sets for 1,000 times.Fertility and Labor Supply 30
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Figure I: Total Fertility Rates and Dependency RatiosFertility and Labor Supply 31
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 Source; Author's calculation from Vital Statistics.
Figure II: Labor Force Participation and Number of Births by Age